

1 **From policy strategies towards individual reactions: A case study-driven**
2 **analysis of the role of shocks for climate resilient development**

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30 **Abstract**

31 Climate change impacts are major challenges for economy and society. Structural change is becoming
32 imperative, focusing on climate resilient development, including mitigative and adaptive approaches.
33 However, a current mismatch between capacities and the policy strategies and instruments fails to
34 encourage climate resilient development. Based on a mixed-methods approach, using document
35 analysis as well as semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and affected individuals, this paper
36 elaborates how climatic and non-climatic shocks can lead to major changes in policy strategy
37 development, promoting transformative changes and effectively leading to higher climate resilience.
38 Following the IPCCs' concept of Climate Resilient Development Pathways, we use three case studies in
39 Austria to analyse the role of shocks over three phases, their effect on policy strategies, and how these
40 strategies impact specific reactions of affected individuals. The shocks cover flood, multi-seasonal
41 drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

42 While after the shocks several existing and intended strategies were adapted and implemented to
43 support affected individuals' coping and policy strategies were partly revised, we do not find any
44 transformative power of the shocks, due to multiple factors. General system performance is negatively
45 affected by disconnected governance levels, fragmented sectoral perspectives and the lack of taking
46 regional particularities into account by higher-level strategies. In the case of overarching, binding
47 strategies and objectives, the implementation of policy instruments at subordinate level is better
48 supported. At the individual level, we find no joint realisation of mitigative and adaptative measures
49 being triggered by policy strategies. Yet, there is also no clear cut which reactions were actually
50 triggered by the shock or by parallel factors, such as long-term planning, staff availability or rising
51 energy costs. Revised policy strategies and instruments should include binding elements, regional
52 differentiation, flexibilisation, as well as incentives for regional transformative adaptation towards
53 climate resilient development.

54

55 **1. Introduction**

56 Shocks are characterised as exogenous, rare, harmful, disruptive, and urgent events that may
57 overstretch current coping capacities (Grossman 2015; Dolan 2021). In the recent past, various shocks
58 through natural hazard events around the globe, such as the wildfires and thunderstorms in North
59 America, or the severe droughts in South-Western Europe had heavy impacts on regional economic,
60 social and ecological systems. In addition to the deplorable human losses, damages to material assets
61 are estimated at US\$ 250 billion for 2023 (Munich RE 2024). Losses caused by extreme weather events
62 are likely to increase in the near future as regions continue to experience the ongoing impact of global
63 warming (Dottori et al. 2018; Blöschl et al. 2019; Koks et al. 2019; IPCC 2022; Raymond et al. 2020).

64 Climate resilient development pathways (CRDPs) are trajectories for integrating climate change
65 adaptation and mitigation to realize the goal of sustainable development, navigating the complex
66 interactions between climate, social and ecological systems (IPCC 2022). Different actors, influenced
67 by factors such as science, local knowledge, or the media, are both active and passive in designing and
68 navigating CRDPs. Climatic or non-climatic shocks, e.g. droughts, floods or COVID-19, might disrupt
69 these pathways. Especially the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerability of current societal and
70 economic systems to shocks and stresses (IPCC 2014, 2022). Shocks often enable substantial
71 reorientation of policy strategies (Thaler et al. 2020) by opening a policy window where existing policy
72 arrangements that are designed only for managing routine developments may be discarded for a
73 period of rapid policy evolution (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2016). However, radical and
74 catalytic change happens rarely after a shock (Solecki & Michaels 1994).

75 In this paper, we illustrate the role of shocks by tracing policy strategy development and reactions of
76 affected individuals over three phases based on the CRDP concept: before, during and after a shock.
77 In the first phase (termed: *strategy development*) we include the underlying system performance prior
78 to the shock (Farley et al. 2007; O'Donovan 2017), that is, how various stakeholders at different
79 governance levels had managed previous conditions and had put specific policy strategies and
80 instruments into place to prepare for and anticipate eventual shocks. How these stakeholders assess
81 the policy problem and design policy strategies to deal with it is typically coloured by their predominant
82 (policy) narratives (Sabatier 2007; Zahariadis 2007; Biesbroek 2021; Kammermann & Angst 2021; Zhou
83 et al. 2021) and beliefs (McBeth et al. 2005; Shanahan et al. 2011; Shanahan et al. 2013; Jones et al.
84 2014; Crow & Jones 2018). The second phase (termed: *strategy application*) is kicked off by a climatic
85 or non-climatic shock, resulting in a realignment of pathways that is shaped by already implemented
86 strategies or by ad-hoc emergent instruments that are developed in response to the shock. The third
87 phase shows the actions and outcomes of those affected by the shock (termed: *strategy impact*),
88 including societal as well as individual protective and/or non-protective responses (Grothmann &
89 Reusswig 2006; Babicky & Seebauer 2019; Kuhlicke et al. 2020; Seebauer & Babicky 2021; Noll et al.
90 2021), which are shaped by the individuals' risk and coping appraisal (Grothmann & Reusswig 2006;
91 Babicky & Seebauer 2019; Kuhlicke et al. 2020).

92 We use three case studies from different regions and sectors in Austria to analyse the role of shocks
93 over the three phases of CRDPs, in particular how policy strategies evolve in consequence of a shock,
94 and how these strategies impact specific reactions chosen by affected individuals. Covering diverse
95 shocks, policy domains and affected individuals, our three case studies are: a) residential relocation
96 after a flood, b) agricultural water management after a multi-seasonal drought, and c) tourism
97 investments during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The selected case studies are highly

98 heterogeneous, to allow for different views: While, for example, there is long-standing experience with
 99 water management measures in the case of drought (Iglesias and Garrote 2015), the COVID-19
 100 pandemic was an entirely new experience (Gössling et al. 2021), triggering the transfer of established
 101 climate policy instruments (e.g. promoting local renovation) as a reaction to the pandemic's impacts
 102 on the tourism sector. Relocation, on the other hand, is a unique and highly contested adaptation
 103 measure that has so far only been implemented as a last resort, but will likely gain importance as
 104 climate risks increase. In all three case studies the long-term recovery and prevention of future shocks
 105 have the potential to advance climate change adaptation as well as mitigation agendas.

106 **2. Method**

107 **a. Description of case studies**

108 The three selected case studies show empirically how shocks meet policy strategies and may promote
 109 transformative change towards lower carbon emissions and higher climate resilience. Table 1 presents
 110 the case studies' main characteristics.

111 *Table 1: Main characteristics of case studies*

	Case Study 1: Flood	Case Study 2: Multi-seasonal drought	Case Study 3: COVID-19
Region	Eferding Basin, Northern Austria	Seewinkel, Eastern Austria	Tyrol, Western Austria
Area	60 km ² ; rural; residential sprawl of nearby urban region of Linz in federal state of Upper Austria	450 km ² ; rural area east of Lake Neusiedl in the federal state of Burgenland	12,648 km ² ; federal state; mostly rural; many tourism municipalities; located in the Alps
Population at risk	About 700 households	About 1,000 farms cultivate about 33,000 hectare	About 21,800 accommodation providers with about 341,000 touristic beds
Shock (most recent hazard event)	Danube flood 2013	Multi-seasonal drought 2018-2022	COVID-19 pandemic 2020-2022
Individuals affected (unit of analysis)	Residents (private households)	Farmers (family businesses)	Tourism entrepreneurs (hospitality managers/owners, mostly family businesses)

112

113 In the paper, we differentiate between regional and local level. Thereby, the term regional comprises
 114 the federal state level as well as the whole area of Seewinkel and Eferding Basin, whereas the term
 115 local refers to the municipal level, villages as well as sites of private houses, farms or touristic
 116 accommodations.

117 The Eferding Basin is located upstream of the City of Linz, the capital of the federal state of Upper
 118 Austria. Upper Austria is among the economic centres of Austria, including large international
 119 companies in steel and chemical production, high-tech companies in the ICT-sector, small-medium
 120 enterprises as well as an important agricultural sector. The Eferding Basin is characterized by small-
 121 scale farming and single-detached family buildings, many of them constructed since the 1970s when
 122 the floodplain was claimed for settlement after the construction of hydropower plants along the

123 Danube river (Dolejs et al. 2022). Many inhabitants of the region commute to the nearby city of Linz.
124 The region is highly prone to flood events, experiencing floods in 1954, 1967, 2002 and most recently
125 in 2013 (Blöschl et al. 2013). After the 2013 flood, the public administration foresaw the realization of
126 planned relocation of more than 180 private-owned buildings complemented by technical mitigation
127 measures with total costs of € 96 million (Land Oberösterreich 2024). The policy problem in the flood
128 case study is that the shock of the 2013 flood showed that unadapted housing on the floodplain is no
129 longer tenable and that extensive public flood protection is neither affordable nor feasible. This raised
130 the question how to enter a CRDP that modifies existing buildings or constructs new buildings that
131 comply with both floodproofing and energy efficiency.

132 The Seewinkel region is located in the Austrian federal state of Burgenland, at the Hungarian border,
133 characterized by a semi-arid pannonian climate. Important economic sectors are agriculture and
134 summer tourism, concentrating around Lake Neusiedl and the regional vineyards. Drainaging regional
135 wetlands started in 1945 to gain more land for agriculture, which led to low groundwater levels in
136 periods of low precipitation (Blaschke and Gschöpf, 2011). However, agricultural irrigation highly relies
137 on groundwater (Mitter and Schmid, 2021; Valencia Cotera et al., 2023). Droughts are recurring in the
138 region and their severity peaked in the last years. In particular, farmers experienced severe droughts
139 in 2003, 2013, 2015, 2018-2022 with related impacts of reductions in yield quality and quantity and
140 thus income. The multi-seasonal drought in 2018-2022 represents the starting point of this case study.
141 Facing the challenge of groundwater shortages (due to changing precipitation patterns, higher average
142 temperatures etc.), the policy problem in the Seewinkel is defined as the gap between the impacts of
143 drought on farms' economic viability on the one side, and the current combination of water-
144 demanding land use and insufficient measures to adapt to droughts on the other side.

145 Tyrol has the highest economic dependency on tourism of all Austrian federal states. In 2018, tourism's
146 direct and indirect contribution to the gross regional product was 19,7% (Fritz et al. 2021). In 2019,
147 before the COVID-19 pandemic, 12,4 million tourists caused 49,6 million overnight stays, whereof 92%
148 were generated by foreign tourists (Tirol Werbung 2024). The tourism industry in Tyrol is characterized
149 by a high share of SMEs, especially family businesses (Kallmünzer et al. 2017). Historically, tourism
150 developed predominantly endogenously, controlled by regional entrepreneurs and capital (Bätzing
151 2015). Even before COVID-19, climate change was considered a mid-term but grand challenge for
152 Tyrolian tourism. Climate change will shorten potential ski seasons and declining snow availability will
153 require more intense technical snowmaking (Steiger & Scott 2020). However, COVID-19 turned out to
154 be one of the greatest challenges for tourism, as travel warnings and strict border controls significantly
155 reduced the flow of foreign tourists (Peters & Steiger 2023). In Austria, the entire accommodation
156 sector was locked-down by the authorities in the winter season 2020/21. To reduce the loss of revenue
157 existing funding programs for tourism were increased and new COVID-specific funds were introduced.
158 The lock-down situation also provided the opportunity for major conversion work that would normally
159 have a massive impact on ongoing operations. The policy problem consists of the fact, that despite
160 ambitious sustainability goals, the strategies at both national and regional levels suffer from a lack of
161 binding measures, practical implementation, interdepartmental coordination and fragmented sectoral
162 perspectives. This hampers the development of sustainable hotel and mobility infrastructure, leaving
163 the region vulnerable to ongoing and future challenges in tourism sustainability.

164 The case studies provide a spectrum regarding the onset of the shock, the role of climate change in
165 the policy problem, and the affected individuals. Flood and COVID-19 are momentary, stand-alone
166 events, whereas multi-seasonal drought is an incremental, cumulative stressor. Flood and droughts

167 are exacerbated by climate change, whereas COVID-19 had no direct cause in climatic conditions.
168 However, all three shocks provide a window of opportunity for advancing CRDPs that integrate issues
169 of climate change adaptation and mitigation.

170 **b. *Data and analytical approach***

171 We apply a mixed-method approach (Tashakkori et al. 2021) for triangulation and cross-checking from
172 different perspectives, combining document analysis with semi-structured qualitative interviews. This
173 approach allows comparison, control and confirmation of the collected data and the interpreted
174 results, while avoiding narrow, oversimplifying explanations.

175 The initial document analysis compiled policy documents published at European, national and regional
176 level, to reconstruct system performance and policy strategies for the three case studies. In each case
177 study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders to complement the
178 document analysis, select the most relevant instruments within the policy strategies and to get deeper
179 insights into regional strategy development (flood: n=14; multi-seasonal drought: n=14; COVID-19:
180 n=12). In the flood case, the interviewed stakeholders represented regional associations and
181 governmental agencies for water engineering, spatial planning, disaster aid, or climate coordination,
182 which had been involved in the planning and implementation of the planned relocation process, were
183 responsible for disaster aid payments or designed policy strategies and funding instruments for climate
184 adaptation or mitigation at the national and federal state level. To cover the local authorities, all
185 mayors from the Eferding Basin were interviewed. For the multi-seasonal drought case agricultural
186 interest groups, regional water authorities, water cooperatives, regional associations, and mayors
187 were interviewed, which had extensive experience in the planning and implementation of water
188 management strategies in the region, and represented the agriculture, water and nature conservation
189 sectors. For the COVID-19 case, key stakeholders in the tourism sector were approached at regional
190 and local level, according to whether they influence or participate in the decision-making process (e.g.,
191 tourism association representatives, marketing representatives, experts responsible for tourism
192 strategies at the regional level). In all case studies, stakeholder interviewees were recruited based on
193 their mention in the analysed documents, previous research activities of the authors and website
194 portals; subsequently, sampling was expanded by the snowball-technique.

195 Moreover, in each case study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with affected individuals to
196 understand their perception of as well as their reactions to implemented strategies and instruments
197 (flood: n=17; multi-seasonal drought: n=20; COVID-19: n=18). In the flood case, households were
198 recruited from the address lists of previous research activities, aiming for balanced representation by
199 relocation decision (stay/leave: n=8/9), biographical stage (aged younger/older than 50 years: n=8/9)
200 and coping outcomes (Seebauer & Winkler 2020a). In the multi-seasonal drought case, farmers were
201 purposefully selected to cover a broad scope of agricultural activities, focussing on arable farming and
202 viticulture (conventional/organic: n=7/13; main crops permanent/arable: n=6/14; with/without
203 irrigation: n=17/3). To approach potential interviewees, farmers already known from previous
204 research activities, as well as farmers recommended by advocacy and advisory representatives were
205 contacted. Interviewed farmers were asked to recommend further affected farmsteads they knew in
206 the region. In the COVID-19 case, tourism entrepreneurs that received a subsidy by the federal state
207 of Tyrol (Tiroler Tourismusförderung) were approached. Efforts were made to include a diverse range
208 of accommodation categories. Initial contacts were made with tourism entrepreneurs known from
209 previous projects and those recommended by tourism association representatives. Additionally,

210 interviewed tourism entrepreneurs were asked to recommend further potential interviewees within
 211 the region.

212 All semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face between November 2022 and July 2023
 213 and lasted 60-90 minutes each. Interview audio recordings were transcribed word-for-word for
 214 analysis. Following the CRDPs the interview guideline addressed three phases (Table 2): (1) strategy
 215 development, (2) strategy application, and (3) strategy impacts. Interviewees were instructed to refer
 216 to the last recent hazard event when describing impacts of and reactions to the shock (see Table 1).

217 *Table 2: Main interview topics*

Phase 1 – Strategy development	Stakeholders and their area of action
	Policy narratives and beliefs
	System Performance - Policy Problem
	Policy strategies (pre-shock)
Phase 2 – Strategy application	Shock
	Implemented strategies (instruments, post-shock)
Phase 3 – Strategy impact	Risk appraisal
	Coping appraisal
	Non-protective responses
	Individual reactions

218

219 We employed qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2010), using MAXQDA and Atlas.ti software for
 220 coding the interview transcripts. Responses were structured in a category system following the phases
 221 and elements based on the CRDP concept.

222 **3. Results**

223 **a. Case 1: Flood in Eferding Basin**

224 **Phase 1 – Strategy development**

225 In the flood case, the European, national and regional governance levels intersect but lack coordination
 226 between levels and between adaptation and mitigation efforts. Various European directives demand
 227 integrated flood risk management and strict reductions in carbon emissions. At the level of residential
 228 buildings, the EU Floods Directive and the EU Energy Efficiency Directive call for property level flood
 229 risk adaptation measures and improved energy efficiency (EU 2007, 2023). In Austrian flood risk
 230 management, the main responsibility lies with the federal states under the umbrella of the non-binding
 231 National Adaptation Strategy (BMK 2024). Municipalities at the lowest governance level decide on
 232 spatial planning but otherwise have only a consulting role. By contrast, the reduction of carbon
 233 emissions from housing is assigned to the national level, and federal and municipal stakeholders are
 234 expected to promote the roll-out and uptake of national policy instruments. Insufficient coordination
 235 between these strategies leads to inconsistent policy objectives, funding schemes and involved
 236 stakeholders. For instance, the federal Climate and Energy Strategy of Upper Austria claims to

237 integrate adaptation and mitigation goals, but lists housing and flood hazards as separate and
238 unconnected activity areas (Land Oberösterreich 2022). Flood risk management follows a paradigm of
239 public structural measures (Seebauer et al. 2023). There exist no funding schemes for flood-proofing
240 of private buildings, only disaster aid payments which are available after a flood event but focus on
241 recovery from flood damages and on rebuilding as before the flood. A national subsidy scheme
242 supports building insulation, retrofitting of roofs and windows and changing to a non-fossil heating
243 system; however, the overall renovation rate is low because of unattractive incentives
244 (Umweltbundesamt 2023).

245 Before the 2013 flood, it was already evident to the regional administration that the (implicitly) agreed
246 protection level of a 100-year flood return period could not be maintained in the Eferding Basin within
247 the dominant technical-oriented narrative of public flood protection by means of linear built
248 infrastructure. Thus, the market-oriented narrative of providing awareness building and economic
249 incentives for households to adapt their buildings on their own accord, that had already been common
250 in mitigation policy, gradually gained traction in adaptation policy as well. These policy narratives met
251 a mentality of do-it-yourself and self-reliance among households with personal or inter-generational
252 flood experience, and a mindset of over-dependency on public protection among those who had
253 recently moved to the region (Seebauer & Winkler 2020b). Nevertheless, both the adaptation and
254 mitigation policy strategies built on the acceptance and willingness of the home-owners to take action.
255 A small circle of policy entrepreneurs at the federal level pushed regional strategies by means of long-
256 term collaboration; still, they acted within their respective policy silos and did not consider mitigation
257 benefits from adaptation strategies and vice versa.

258 ***Phase 2 – Strategy application***

259 In the days and weeks immediately after the shock, flood-affected residents received substantial
260 resource inflow in terms of volunteer workforce for cleanup and repair, as well as monetary support
261 from disaster aid payments (which is provided by the regional authority) and charity donations. These
262 resources were, however, directed (directly and indirectly) at restoring the situation prior to the flood.
263 In the light of the excessive damages, the public administration finally abandoned their habitual
264 technical-oriented narrative and introduced a planned relocation strategy with the aim to minimise
265 the level of exposure in the Eferding Basin. Households were compensated for 80% of their building's
266 value if they volunteered to move away from the floodplain and demolished their former home.
267 Households who opted to stay were subjected to a building ban that prohibits extending or modifying
268 their homes. The relocation strategy was designed after a previous application a decade ago in the
269 nearby Machland-Nord area, with the major difference that in Machland-Nord the decision to stay or
270 leave had to be taken jointly by the whole hamlets, whereas in the Eferding Basin households took this
271 decision individually (Thaler et al. 2020). Moreover, in Machland-Nord the hamlet communities were
272 offered land plots outside the risk zone to resettle together, whereas in the Eferding Basin the
273 households had to acquire building plots on the open housing market.

274 The policy instruments for climate change mitigation in the private housing sector had already been
275 implemented pre-shock and were not changed by the shock of the 2013 flood. Both funding for energy
276 efficient building renovation and standards for new construction had evolved since the 1990s, turning
277 stricter in parallel to increasingly stringent national carbon emission reduction targets. Those
278 households who relocated and rebuilt in a flood-safe location had to comply with strict energy
279 efficiency regulations for their new homes. However, these standards only required a specific
280 maximum energy consumption per floor area (in kWh/m² per year) and therefore did not preclude

281 backfire effects from rebuilding larger than the original houses in the floodplain had been. As further
282 indication of lacking policy coordination, the disaster aid, donations and relocation compensation were
283 paid out to remunerate lost assets and did not prescribe or incentivise any building improvements
284 regarding flood-proofing or energy efficiency. However, this bundle of adaptation and mitigation policy
285 strategies met a constrained housing market with increasing price levels for properties and real estate.
286 Latecomer households were further confronted with inflation and rising credit interest rates following
287 the Ukraine war. Together, this meant that affected households faced high uncertainty both from the
288 future flood risk in the Eferding Basin and from their housing options.

289 ***Phase 3 – Strategy impact***

290 Almost a decade after the flood and the announcement of the relocation strategy, all interviewed
291 households acknowledge the persistent flood risk. As next flood, they picture a large-scale disaster
292 with water at chest level on the ground floor but at the same time they are highly uncertain regarding
293 the return period and damages of a future flood. Similar to denial as a non-protective response, they
294 shirk from specific considerations what such a disaster would entail for their livelihood.

295 Among those households who left the floodplain, the policy strategy lead to two-sided reactions. Public
296 disaster aid, insurance and donations were paid out to refund the costs for restoring damaged private
297 assets. Households spent these payments for quick recovery and for re-establishing their damaged
298 homes for having a place to live. However, when they eventually moved out and demolished their
299 former home these interim investments turned out to be wasted. Their new homes are obviously no
300 longer exposed to flooding, as they had to move out of the floodplain, and are highly energy efficient
301 because of mandatory building codes for new construction and because heat pumps are now
302 (compared to the construction period of their former homes) a common heating technology. Thus, in
303 principle, the shock of the flood and the related policy strategy incurred substantial gains regarding
304 climate change adaptation and mitigation. However, most households built their new homes with a
305 larger living area; thus, part of the efficiency gain was offset by increased energy demand. These
306 households compensated the emotional loss of their previous residence by aiming for a ‘perfect home’
307 with more space and extended facilities (such as air conditioning). When planning the new home, they
308 only considered the short-term residential needs of their current family constellation. Now, a few years
309 later, they realise that their new homes are oversized as their children have moved out or the
310 grandparents have passed away. Only few households deliberately downshifted to smaller housing
311 because their children had already left the parental home, because they prepared for barrier-free living
312 in older age, or because of financial restrictions. Farmer households are entitled by Austrian law to
313 build anywhere on their cropland regardless of zoning specifications but local authorities must approve
314 whether the building construction plan qualifies for a farm and not just a residential building. Thus,
315 some farmers who relocated were obliged to oversize barns and garages but were restricted in their
316 residential areas which partially buffered their overall backfire in the size of living area.

317 Among those households who rejected the relocation offer and decided to stay in the floodplain, the
318 policy strategy mostly failed as these households improved neither flood protection nor energy
319 efficiency of their buildings. In their coping appraisal, they claim high self-efficacy for tackling
320 emergency and repair measures during an eventual flood. However, they consider most preventive
321 flood-proofing measures as futile against an overwhelming flood risk and implement only minor
322 adaptation measures such as flood-resistant floors and plasterwork or prepare furniture and
323 machinery to be easily broken down and carried to a higher level. They have insulated their roofs, but
324 refrain from wall insulation because they expect that Styrofoam plating will retain humidity from

325 floodwater, leading to mold and damages to wall integrity. Few have installed heat pumps; most stick
326 to wood-chip heating instead because they have excessive wood fuel available from their own forests
327 and therefore have no incentive to switch to more efficient heating. However, many plan investing in
328 photovoltaic panels. Building modifications are implemented in a do-it-yourself manner, typically as
329 part of upkeep and maintenance and unrelated to their flood experience. These piecemeal
330 modifications are not notified to the authorities and therefore do not show up in building registers. On
331 a positive note, the building ban of the relocation strategy was effective in preventing living area
332 increases. However, selected savvy households had quickly obtained construction permits before the
333 building ban entered into force. As these permits could not be revoked, these buildings now feature
334 increased living areas and consequently pose higher flood risk and energy demand.

335 **b. Case 2: Multi-seasonal drought in Seewinkel**

336 **Phase 1 – Strategy development**

337 EU, national and regional policy level affect agricultural water management in the Seewinkel region.
338 At EU level, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) intends to shape the agricultural sector. Currently,
339 it is designed to contribute to the adaptive and mitigative ambitions of the European Green Deal,
340 including the Farm to Fork Strategy and the EU Biodiversity Strategy. Austria’s agri-environmental
341 programme ‘ÖPUL’ is implemented within the CAP. Designed to support farmers and rural
342 stakeholders to secure the achievement of the EU strategies’ goals, it specifies operational and
343 bureaucratic requirements. National policy strategies, such as the Austrian National Water
344 Management Plan (implementation in six-year cycles, started in 2009), as well as cross-border panels,
345 such as the Austrian-Hungarian Cross-border Water Commission, affect regional policy strategies. At
346 regional and local level, water authorities of the federal state of Burgenland, the Chamber of
347 Agriculture Burgenland, the authorities of the national park “Neusiedler See – Seewinkel” and water
348 cooperatives are mentioned as main stakeholders representing and coordinating different interests in
349 land and water use.

350 The predominant policy narratives and beliefs regarding the policy problem are twofold: For farmers,
351 on the one hand, the economic aspects are prevalent, as their main goal is to make a decent living
352 from their farm, and to preserve the (family) business. Stakeholders, on the other hand, also stress the
353 status of the groundwater body, the preservation of unique ecosystems, national food security, the
354 value of regionally produced food and the preservation of regional tourism as main policy goals. In
355 comparison, the stakeholders primarily promote a technical-oriented narrative, such as the funding of
356 more efficient irrigation measures which is more strongly propagated than, for example, changing to
357 water-saving crops. Irrigation management and the discussion of an irrigation ban show a rules-
358 oriented spin of narratives.

359 The evolution of the policy problem was already evident before the shock, due to previous droughts.
360 However, sectoral perspectives prevailed in policy design, with limited coordination and integration
361 between the crucial agriculture, water, and nature conservation sectors, leaving the region vulnerable,
362 especially as climate change progresses. However, the regional government introduced a ‘task force’
363 in 2018 which should promote cooperation between the sectors in the future.

364 The national strategies were connected to water quality and management but only few directly
365 addressed drought (for example subsidized drought insurance). Specific measures of the ÖPUL

366 programme supported greening or reduced soil cultivation and, hence, affect agricultural water
367 management directly and indirectly. This pattern continued after the shock.

368 ***Phase 2 – Strategy application***

369 The national government opted not to provide any compensation for farmers after the shock. This
370 decision was taken because of a regulatory amendment in 2018, specifying that state aid is not
371 available for losses resulting from insurable risks (such as drought risk). The the multi-seasonal drought
372 2018-2022 stimulated regional stakeholders' discussions about revising or refining existing strategies,
373 as well as about developing new strategies to tackle the policy problem. Existing strategies included
374 the monitoring system of the groundwater level as well as technical approaches such as backwatering,
375 more efficient irrigation systems, external water supply from other water bodies, and breeding
376 drought-tolerant crops. In the aftermath of the shock, the monitoring system of the groundwater level
377 was tightened with stricter warning levels, leading to irrigation restrictions for certain crops and
378 technologies during daytime. Backwatering has been implemented only locally but could be extended
379 in the short-term, given, for instance, the provision of financial resources.

380 The shock has also increased the pressure for supporting water and energy efficient irrigation systems
381 at the large-scale (e.g. drip irrigation). While already common for vineyards and orchards, consulting
382 initiatives have been extended to introduce such technologies also for field crops. Subsidies for
383 investments in irrigation infrastructure have partially been increased for conventional but also for
384 more sustainable irrigation infrastructure. For external water supply, different options regarding its
385 source (e.g., surface water from Austrian or Hungarian part of Danube) and destination (i.e., to Lake
386 Neusiedl or the groundwater body) were discussed. Though the shock has clearly fueled discussions,
387 many decisions are still pending and stakeholders stress the long lead time of large-scale projects.
388 Stakeholders also highlight the breeding of drought tolerant crops as a long-term endeavor. However,
389 the responsibility for providing new breeds is mostly delegated to the private sector. A new strategy
390 that has been addressed very cautiously is the introduction of groundwater pricing, as a control
391 mechanism for groundwater use and an incentive for the selection of less irrigation-intensive species
392 and varieties.

393 The shock led to a change in narratives and as such in policy strategies: Before the shock, irrigation
394 bans were already part of the policy strategy, but not yet in force. With a rule-oriented policy narrative
395 becoming more important after the shock, a local irrigation ban during daytime was executed in the
396 most affected municipalities. Some of the interviewed farmers understand the need for the ban to
397 preserve groundwater. Others are more critically and worry about more intensive irrigation during
398 nighttime with no ultimate effect on water demand, as well as about being forced to irrigate under
399 adverse – e.g. windy – conditions. Similarly, stakeholders warn that incentives for more efficient
400 irrigation systems may lead to an increase in the total irrigated area.

401 ***Phase 3 – Strategy impact***

402 Farmers show high awareness for climate change and droughts, yet risk perception varies widely ('all
403 is getting worse' vs. 'changing weather is normal'). At the same time, they tend to differentiate
404 between the future of their own farm and the future of the sector in the region, which they expect to
405 be very challenging, especially for those without sufficient measures in place. The findings illustrate
406 the background of farms being residencies of private people (attachment, worries and psychological
407 stress) and simultaneously business locations (cognitive risk perception focusing on the economic
408 viability of the farms).

409 Regarding coping appraisal, farmers show a high degree of self efficacy. Most assess their implemented
410 measures against drought as sufficient and as the best they can do. No cases of inaction appear in our
411 sample, as all farmers emphasize that they realize drought adaptation measures within the range of
412 their possibilities.

413 Funding measures are implemented if they match the farmers' goals and operational strategy, often
414 as add-on support (i.e. windfall benefit) to existing or already planned measures. While we do not find
415 any non-protective responses regarding drought-related measures, we find to some degree fatalism,
416 in the sense that weather and climate are conceived as beyond the influence of regional stakeholders
417 and farmers.

418 In general, regular exchange among farmers as well as mutual 'learning by example' is reported,
419 leading to a high degree of response efficacy. Additionally, many see themselves as frontrunners and
420 leading examples for others. However, there are also complaints about free-riding 'copycats' who even
421 receive funding for adopting measures that frontrunners had applied at their own risk and cost.

422 Besides from the fact that we have not found inaction, the farmers' individual reactions show a
423 pragmatic mix of measures, shaped by factors external and internal to the farm. External factors
424 include available strategies and accessible funding instruments, as well as contracts regarding varieties
425 and commodity prices. Internal factors include the farm's economic situation and technical
426 infrastructure. Good practice examples for farmers' climate resilient individual reactions include the
427 implementation of water saving irrigation, water saving soil cultivation or changing to more drought
428 tolerant crops. Poor practice examples include high share of water-demanding crops. However, the
429 farmers' individual reactions cannot be strictly attributed to the shock, as some measures are already
430 in place for decades or the result of other entrepreneurial decisions (e.g. gross margin of crops,
431 challenges in weed control, crop rotation).

432 The agricultural sector has a high potential and need to contribute to climate change mitigation. Yet,
433 the measures implemented by farmers focus on drought adaptation and hardly leverage benefits for
434 climate change mitigation, such as solar-powered water pumps or greening and reduced soil
435 cultivation for carbon sequestration.

436 **c. Case 3: COVID-19 in Tyrol**

437 **Phase 1 – Strategy development**

438 The tourism sector in Tyrol is governed by a variety of political instruments, including strategies, laws,
439 and subsidies at both national and federal level. A diverse array of local, regional, and national
440 stakeholders is shaping these instruments. At the national level, the main tourism strategy is
441 formulated through "Plan T - Masterplan for Tourism" (introduced in 2019). The national strategy is
442 complemented by regional efforts, particularly the Tyrolean tourism strategy "Tiroler Weg"
443 (introduced in 1999 being regularly updated before and after the pandemic), which is not legally
444 binding but aims to provide strategic guidelines to partners, particularly tourism associations and
445 regional tourism organizations. The recent edition of Tyrol's regional tourism strategy emphasizes
446 quality over quantity, advocating for a reduction in the number of touristic beds and the integration of
447 ecological, economic, and social sustainability into tourism practices. Some aspects of the regional
448 tourism strategy have been incorporated into regional acts and legislations (e.g., Tyrolean Tourism Law
449 2006-2022), such as the implementation of sustainability managers in all 34 tourism associations.

450 However, the regional tourism strategy lacks binding power, concrete implementation measures, and
451 specific funding information.

452 Despite ambitious sustainability goals, the strategies at both national and regional level suffer from a
453 lack of cohesion and coordination with similar strategies from other departments and fragmented
454 sectoral perspectives. The narratives and beliefs underpinning these strategies are varied. While eco-
455 oriented narratives, such as those addressing carrying capacity, land use conflicts, and resource use,
456 are present, economic narratives dominate the discourse, aiming to safeguard and promote tourism.
457 Market-oriented, liberalism, and individualism perspectives further emphasize economic incentives,
458 such as subsidies, and individual responsibility. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was already evident
459 that Tyrol's tourism sector needed to become more sustainable in terms of adaptation as well as
460 mitigation, particularly concerning carrying capacity and resource use. Despite the ambitious aims, the
461 strategies often fall short in practical implementation and interdepartmental coordination. The
462 fragmented perspectives and lack of binding measures leave the region vulnerable to ongoing and
463 future challenges in tourism sustainability.

464 ***Phase 2 – Strategy application***

465 Since a situation like COVID-19 had never occurred before, there were no instruments in place that
466 could be used to support affected tourism entrepreneurs. During the pandemic, existing policy
467 instruments were revisited and re-purposed for coping with the pandemic, or instruments were newly
468 conceptualized. The funding volume for Tyrolean tourism support increased substantially. While in
469 2019, subsidies of € 224,597 were approved for investments of € 4.1 million, this multiplied to € 1.65
470 million subsidies (+638%) and € 36.8 million investments (+793%) in 2020 and € 2.9 million subsidies
471 (+74%) and € 40.1 million investments (+11%) in 2021.

472 In some of the revisions and in the development of new instruments, there is a noticeable increase in
473 the inclusion of climate protection and sustainability aspects in regional tourism strategies and the
474 Tyrolean tourism funding guidelines. For instance, the Tyrolean Tourism Law was revised to legally
475 incorporate sustainability coordinators for destination management organizations. Therefore, it has
476 become mandatory for all 34 destination management organizations to employ a sustainability
477 coordinator, whose task is (among others) to create annual sustainability reports. Financial support
478 programs also saw a stronger integration of climate aspects, such as the amendment of guidelines to
479 ensure that investment projects focus on energy efficiency and resource conservation and to integrate
480 ecological criteria, such as the 'ban on fossil fuels' and the promotion of 'ecologization'.

481 During the peak of the pandemic, many strategy revisions appeared to have happened 'coincidentally'.
482 The process often began before COVID-19, with prior developments setting the stage. However, the
483 pandemic created a political window of opportunity that allowed for changes towards the
484 incorporation of more sustainability, being driven by various political stakeholders and especially the
485 Green party. Interviews with tourism stakeholders indicate that the pandemic provided the necessary
486 momentum and political opportunity for strategic changes, heightened awareness, and allowed time
487 for strategic work.

488 Thus, the pandemic was not the initiator but rather the final impetus for changes in laws, subsidies,
489 and strategies that had already been circulating or were on the back burner.

490 Additionally, the pandemic brought to the forefront questions about the new strategic positioning and
491 direction of tourism. In the process of strategy changes, the role of certain stakeholders in the tourism

492 system is highlighted, who play a significant part in navigating and advocating changes in policy
493 strategies. The Tyrolean tourism strategy “Tiroler Weg”, published in 2021 in its current version, was
494 mentioned by several interviewees from tourism associations and public administration as
495 representing a strategic shift of how tourism development in Tyrol is desired for the future. However,
496 it remains complex to discern the precise role of the pandemic as a shock event in triggering these
497 changes, especially amidst multiple overlapping crises.

498 ***Phase 3 – Strategy impact***

499 Interviewed tourism entrepreneurs’ risk appraisal shows that COVID-19 is perceived as a one-off event
500 and that other risks are currently more urgent. The pandemic coincided with other urgent issues such
501 as the Ukraine war, energy supply challenges, inflation, and the lack of staff availability in the tourism
502 sector. This overlapping of crises introduces a fuzziness regarding which reactions of tourism
503 entrepreneurs were specifically triggered by the pandemic versus other parallel developments or
504 factors.

505 Climate risks for tourism are acknowledged but not experienced as an immediate threat, also due to
506 well preparation of the sector. On the contrary, Tyrol is perceived as a net winner of climate change as
507 the Alps are seen as a refuge from serious climate impacts elsewhere (e.g. heat waves, droughts).

508 The coping appraisal of interviewed tourism entrepreneurs shows a very diverse degree of self efficacy.
509 While some interviewees stress that it is within the scope of action of each individual to contribute to
510 climate change mitigation, others would like to act, but do not see how they could do so.

511 Interviewees’ individual reactions show that the phases of the lock-down were used by many
512 businesses to implement outstanding projects. However, many of these plans have already been in the
513 drawer, which suggests that the crisis was not necessarily a driver for profound changes but rather an
514 accelerator of already ongoing processes. Mitigation measures include improving energy efficiency in
515 hotels (e.g. switching to renewable energies, improving thermal insulation) or the connection to
516 sustainable mobility services. Investments go hand in hand with financial incentives. Tourism as a
517 cross-sectional topic has access to diverse opportunities for funding. However, the industry suffers
518 from considerable confusion regarding the available information, often perceived as a ‘funding jungle’.
519 This information overload represents a significant barrier that prevents many from timely approaching
520 funding agencies. Often, this happens after construction projects have already begun or other
521 investments have been made.

522 Good practices for tourism entrepreneurs include a repositioning of the tourism offer while creating
523 climate-friendly products (e.g. renovation of existing infrastructure). Poor practices includes the
524 creation of new offers that are energy intensive (e.g. thermal spas, indoor and outdoor pools).

525 **4. Discussion**

526 The article presents the role of shocks as potential turning points for climate resilient development
527 pathways that integrate climate change adaptation and mitigation to realize the overall societal goal
528 of sustainable development. We next discuss the interrelations between policy strategy, shock and
529 individual reactions within and across case studies.

530 **a. *The role of shocks in Case 1: Flood in Eferding Basin***

531 After the 2013 flood and the announcement of the planned relocation strategy, most households
532 focused on a fast-recovery process with minor adaptation and mitigation efforts. This was mainly
533 driven by the fact that they had marginal contact with governance actors, even at the municipal level,
534 and hardly adopted the available policy instruments. They relied on their own technical expertise and
535 did not access consulting apart from architects, construction engineers and informal contacts to
536 neighbours or family. Nevertheless, the combination of policy instruments was partially successful by
537 decreasing the number of exposed households in the floodplain and achieving energy savings at the
538 newly constructed buildings because of building regulations at national and regional level.

539 Both the policy strategy and the households frame choices on building modification within a market-
540 oriented narrative. The policy strategy has a narrow scope on voluntary funding schemes and forgoes
541 other instruments such as consulting, regulations (apart from building codes and the building ban) or
542 taxes. Households describe their building decisions in monetary terms as balancing costs and effort
543 with the expected benefits. Thus, the degree of adaptation or mitigation mainly depends on the
544 willingness and financial capabilities of households, and backfire seems logical if households are able
545 and willing to pay for larger living areas. Furthermore, households often describe the funding schemes
546 (except the relocation compensation payment) as an add-on windfall profit to choices they would have
547 taken anyway. Overall, the results show that a broader societal transformation process was not
548 reached even after a radical risk management strategy such as planned relocation. One core reason is
549 the lack of a broader policy coordination between climate adaptation and mitigation policies by the
550 national and regional government.

551 **b. *The role of shocks in Case 2: Multi-seasonal drought in Seewinkel***

552 The dominant narratives of economically viable farms and problem solution via technical measures
553 promote an irrigation focus that had already been present before and was maintained in revised form
554 after the multi-seasonal drought 2018-2022. The regional water management strategy that is currently
555 in effect limits total groundwater withdrawal to preserve the regional groundwater body and includes
556 the option of imposing an agricultural irrigation ban. European policy strategies, such as the CAP, are
557 transposed into national funding schemes, but these nationally uniform schemes neither account for
558 regional climate conditions nor for drought impacts. Consequently, farmers typically apply only for
559 those funding schemes that conform with their own farms' goals and are not encouraged by the
560 schemes to reorient their goals. The shock invigorated an ongoing debate on alternative strategies
561 including external water supply, breeding drought-tolerant crops and tighter restrictions on
562 groundwater use. However, this debate has not yet resulted in the implementation of new policy
563 instruments and has not yet instigated new farmer reactions.

564 Irrigation is a contested issue where farmers' appraisals only partially align with the current policy
565 instruments. When a local daytime irrigation ban was executed for the first time in 2022, some farmers
566 reacted by investing in water-saving drip irrigation systems which are exempt from the ban. However,
567 due to its technical setup drip irrigation is better suited for permanent crops than for arable farming,
568 thus excluding a sizeable agricultural segment. Other farmers postpone irrigation investments as they
569 face uncertainty and concerns regarding the future frequency of irrigation bans, insufficient grid
570 connections to operate electrical water pumps in the open field, high work effort during installation or
571 short device lifetimes from damage by ultraviolet radiation and rodents resulting in plastic residues

572 from the irrigation tubes remaining in the soil. Investment funding often has an add-on effect because
573 they support adaptation measures that farmers would adopt anyway.

574 **c. *The role of shocks in Case 3: COVID-19 in Tyrol***

575 When the tourism sector in Tyrol was hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, a range of measures was
576 implemented to support the sector. Subsidies were a crucial element of this package, which were both
577 increased and expanded. The guidelines were revised to incorporate ecological criteria. However, the
578 interviewees mentioned that most of the measures would have been implemented anyway, which
579 indicates an add-on effect.

580 The COVID-19 pandemic was not the decisive, but a supporting driver for profound changes in the
581 tourism sector. The initiatives for transforming the sector can be attributed to an ongoing process of
582 change that had already begun before the shock. COVID-19 opened a window of opportunity to bring
583 sustainability aspects into practice that had already been considered for some time, both in revising
584 strategies and in realising hotel renovation and construction projects. These processes were driven by
585 various political stakeholders, with the Green party playing a particularly significant role at both the
586 state and federal levels.

587 **d. *Cross-case discussion***

588 In **phase 1**, across all three case studies, system performance was impaired by prevailing conflicts of
589 interests, fragmented sectoral perspectives and disconnection between governance levels, especially
590 between the national and regional level. If non-binding, national policy strategies are not (sufficiently)
591 recognised and transposed at the regional and local level. By contrast, EU directives as in the flood and
592 the multi-annual drought cases lead to the implementation of national and regional strategies and
593 measures. At the same time, overarching strategies hardly account for regional or local particularities.
594 In the absence of EU-level pressure, as in the COVID-19 tourism case, national and regional strategies
595 and measures tend to be inadequately implemented. Administrative departments act within their
596 narrow area of responsibility and are not encouraged or obliged to coordinate with other departments
597 in neighbouring fields. Additionally, the national and regional level pursue a long-term planning
598 perspective, whereas the local level considers mainly short-term impacts and needs.

599 The lack of pre-shock policy coordination spills over to **phase 2** in that the policy instruments which
600 are implemented to deal with the shock have a narrow scope that does not account for climate
601 resilience. The respective shocks did not induce entirely new policy instruments, but brought options
602 to the table that had been debated but not realised before the shock: In the flood case, the planned
603 relocation strategy was introduced which was modelled after a previous application in a neighbouring
604 area; in the multi-annual drought case, the threat of the irrigation ban was carried out for the first
605 time; in the COVID-19 case, additional funding for tourism support was made available. However, these
606 emergent instruments are not coordinated with other instruments that are already in place and
607 therefore do not deploy to their full effect: In the flood case, the policy strategy overlooks the need to
608 advance adaptation and mitigation among the households who stay on the floodplain; in the drought
609 case, farmers lack funding and support to adopt water-saving irrigation or other drought management
610 options; in the COVID-19 case, the financial support dedicated to sustainable tourism was hardly visible
611 within an overall confusing funding landscape. Moreover, the policy strategy is applied in a uniform
612 manner and does not differentiate between individual needs (in the flood case) or between different
613 regions and hence climatic conditions (in the drought case).

614 **Phase 3** shows that the policy strategies do not trigger joint realisation of mitigative and adaptive
615 measures. Especially in the multi-annual drought case the focus is on adaptation with little mitigation
616 happening at all. Mitigative measures are mostly implemented as a side benefit to adaptive measures
617 (e.g. greening); only rarely they have the dedicated purpose of reducing carbon emission (e.g. electric
618 instead of fossil fuel powered irrigation pumps). Households who relocated from the floodplain and
619 rebuilt in a flood-safe and energy efficient manner are prone to a backfire effect from oversized floor
620 areas that partially offsets the efficiency gains. The policy strategies of all three case studies prefer
621 funding schemes over regulations. If regulations are present, as the building ban on the floodplain or
622 the temporary irrigation ban, they serve as trigger for individuals to reflect on how they plan to prepare
623 for future risk. In order to direct these plans to climate resilient development, the policy strategies rely
624 on voluntary funding schemes, which do not have a steering effect but rather provide add-on
625 incentives for individual intentions that would be realised anyway.

626 However, the effect of the shock as a distinct milestone on a climate resilient development pathway
627 does not emerge as clear-cut from the empirical data, as might be expected from the transformation
628 literature. In the multi-annual drought case and the COVID-19 cases, the reactions of farmers and
629 tourism entrepreneurs are also driven by parallel developments such as long-term business outlook,
630 staff availability, energy costs etc., which makes it hard to disentangle the unique effect of the shock.
631 As all three case studies rely on qualitative interviews, we cannot exclude that the observed reactions
632 to the shock could be coloured by the selection of interviewees. For instance in the multi-annual
633 drought case, we could not recruit farmers with large-scale water-intensive crops who solely rely on
634 irrigation. Moreover, the high self-efficacy of the interviewed farmers could also indicate a certain
635 sampling bias, because less confident farmers who struggle with drought risk might be less willing to
636 agree to an interview.

637 **5. Conclusions**

638 Following the Climate Resilient Development Pathways (CRDPs) concept we illustrate for three case
639 studies the impacts of climatic and non-climatic shocks, tracing policy strategies and reactions of
640 affected individuals as they develop before, during and after the shock, in other words, over the phases
641 of strategy development, application and impact. While existing strategies were adapted and
642 implemented to support affected individuals to cope with the shock, profound change in policy
643 strategies towards sustainability or climate resilience did not happen. Thus, within the Austrian policy
644 environment of our three case studies, we cannot confirm that climatic and non-climatic shocks have
645 substantial transformative power (Moore et al. 2014, Grossman 2015). Instead, shocks should not be
646 overrated in their relevance for initiating radical change (Solecki & Michaels 1994).

647 All three case studies, which are individually elaborated in further articles, are characterised by a policy
648 problem that had been present and (to some degree) acknowledged by policy actors and affected
649 individuals long before the shock. The shock revealed that the existing policy strategies may fix or at
650 least alleviate the policy problem in the short term, but are insufficient to enter CRDPs. This is mainly
651 because of a lack of policy coordination. The policy strategies are designed and implemented within
652 their respective policy silos and do not leverage synergies for advancing climate change adaptation in
653 concert with mitigation. Unless driven by EU-level requirements and goals, national and regional
654 strategies fall short of a concise, target-oriented development. Besides a cross-sectoral perspective,
655 climate resilient policy strategies should include binding regulations, regional differentiation and
656 flexibility for individual needs. If such policy strategies were implemented in a foresightful manner,

657 future shocks, which will most likely occur more frequently and more severely than in the past, could
658 be used as an opportunity to enter and pursue CRDPs.

659

660 **Declaration of interest statement**

661 No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

662

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